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Of course, the Fed did raise the federal funds rate
from 3 percent to 4.75 percent in a series of five
rate of inflation expected to prevail over the next
10 years was the same in September as it had
been in December 1993. In'addition, the fall in
the dollar generally has been confined to de-
clines against the yen and the mark; if concerns
about higher inflation were behind the dollar's
decline, one wouId have expected the dollar
to decline against all currencies.
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A more likely explanation is that interest rates
rose because of increasing strength in the econ-
omy. The economy was growing very rapidly in
late 1993, and this could very well account for
the fact that rates bottomed out around October
1993 (see Figure 1), well before the Fed began in-
creasing short-term rates. The rise in rates in late
1993 serves as a useful reminder ofthe fact that
interest rates would move over the course of the









Some have suggested that long-term rates rose in
response to an increase in expected inflation;
this is because higher inflation in the future will
push up short-term rates at that time, and long-
term rates today reflect what is expected to hap-
pen to short rates in the future. The evidence on
this explanation is mixed. In support of it, ana-
lysts point to a run-up in commodity prices, as
well as a fall in the value of the dollar. Contra-
dicting it, however, are surveys of expected in-
flation that show no signs of an increase large
enough to explain the recent rise in rates; for in-
stance, a survey by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia showed that, at 3.5 percent, the
This increase in rates has been attributed to a va-
riety of factors. Foreign rates have risen dramat-
ically over this period. Since financial markets
are becoming increasingly integrated worldwide,
the recent rise in U.s. rates couldreflect develop-
ments abroad. However, it is quite possible that
the causation worked in the other direction. In
this context, it is worth pointing out that U.S.
long-term rates began to increase prior to rates in
the other G-7 countries, though long-term rates
in some ofthese countries have risen by more
than u.s. rates since then.
Alternative explanations
As Figure 1 illustrates, rates have risen at all
maturities since the beginning of this year; for
instance, the rate on 3-month Treasury bills over
the first three weeks of September was about 160
basis points higher than in January, the rate on
l-year T-bills was roughly 215 basis points higher,
and the rate on la-year bonds was about 165
basis points higher.
Long-term interest rates have gone up sharply
since the beginning of the year. This rise has
been attributed to a number offactors, including
a stronger U.s. economy, stronger foreign econ-
omies, a rise in inflation expectations, as well
as the Fed's moves to increase short-term rates
over this period. ih this Weekly Letter I look at
the recent behavior of interest rates in an effort
to determine how much support the data offer to
each ofthese factors.FRBSF
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Percent
8.00 In assessing the validity of this explanation it is
important to remember that the Fed has acted
in response to growing evidence of a robust
economy. Indeed, Barro (1994) argues that the
Fed had little choice but to raise the interest
rate-given a desire to maintain a low and stable
rate of inflation. He points out that "... real
interest rates are determined by the interplay
between the supply and demand of credit, de-
termined by the willingness of people allover
the world to save, and their desire to invest."
Stronger economic growth means a greater de-
mand for funds to invest, which puts upward
pressure on interest rates. In this situation, the
Fed's unwillingness to raise interest rates would
only lead to higher inflation. Thus, the Fed's
decision to raise rates was really dictated by
its desire to keep inflation low in the face of a
strong economy.
moves that began February 4. Since market rates
have risen sharply over this period as well, some
have held the Fed responsible for the rise in rates.
While this explanation appears consistent with
the general trend of interest rates over this pe-
riod, it does not answer important questions
about the timing of recent changes in interest
rates. Figure 2 plots daily observations on inter-
est rates of different maturities since last October
and highlights the dates of Fed actions to raise
rates. Note that the rise in interest rates (at all
maturities) since the Fed began to raise rates is
substantially greater than the rise in rates be-
forehand. In addition, rates at maturities of one
year and longer rose sharply when the Fed first
raised rates (on February 4); a similar pattern is
evident when the Fed raised rates the second
time. However, rates at the 10- and 30-year ma-
turities have shown little net change immediately
after the last two increases in the funds rate
(though long rates have gone up again recently,
most likely in response to further evidence of a
strong economy).
The response of long-term rates to the Fed's ac-
tions provides information that can be used to
distinguish among various hypotheses. First, the
increase in long-term rates immediately after
the initial increase in short rates means that it is
unlikely that inflation expectations are the cause
of the rise in long rates. If anything, the Fed's ac-
tion was intended to keep inflation from rising. It
is sometimes suggested that markets might inter-
pret the rate increases as a signal that inflation is
likely to go up, on the grounds that the Fed has
superior information about future inflation. How-
ever, it is hard (even as an insider) to point to any
relevant information that the Fed does not make
public. Second, it also suggests that the explana-
tion that relies upon strength in the economy is
incomplete. If the Fed were simply reacting to
widely perceived signs of strength in the econ-
omy, therewould be no reason for long rates to
rise when short rates were raised.
Anticipating the Fed's behavior
The timing ofthe changes in long-term rates
suggests that the Fed's action was a surprise to
market participants; ifthe action had been an-
ticipated, its effect already would have been in-
corporated in prevailing long-term rates. The
direction of the response also allows us to infer
something about the nature of the surprise. Long
rates should have fallen if the move provided in-
formation about the relative importance the Fed
attaches to inflation. In other words, if markets
interpreted the rise in the funds rate as evidence
that the Fed was more serious about inflation
than they had believed, this move should have
led them to lower their expectations offuture
inflation, causing long rates to fall.
Thus, the nature of the response suggests that the
Fed's action did not provide information about a
shift in the weights it attaches to various objec-
tives; instead, it seems to have provided infor-
mation about the course of action the Fed would
follow in pursuit of those objectives. In other
words, market participants know that the Fedwants low inflation, but they do not know when
it will perceive a need to act to keep inflation
low. Market participants also know that the Fed
has acted gradually in the past. Thus, a move to
increase the funds rate after a period offalling or
stable rates signals to markets that the Fed thinks
it needs to act to keep inflation low, and this
move is likely to be followed by further rate in-
creases. Recognizing this, markets react to a shift
in the stance of monetary policy by immediately
raising long-term interest rates by more than the
initial increase in the funds rate.
Support for this explanation can be found in a
variety of sources. For instance, after the Fed's
first move earlier this year, market commentators
pointed out that the central bank would not con-
fine itself to a mere 25-basis point increase in the
funds rate, since such a move would do little to
restrain either aggregate demand or inflation.
Thus, the move on February 4 was likely to be
the first of many such moves. By the second
quarter of this year, a number of private sector
estimates began to circulate on how far the Fed
would move once it began to raise rates. It is not
hard to believe that this information was reflected
in long rates as well.
The fact that long rates did not react much to
funds rate increases after the first two or three
Fed actions also is consistent with this hypothe-
sis. Specifically, it implies that the Fed's actions
to raise rates were no longer much of a surprise,
since the markets already had incorporated a
risingfunds rate in their forecasts by this time.
Indeed, long rates actually declined when the
funds rate increase on May 17 was accompanied
by a statement to the effect that the Fed was un-
likely to raise rates again in the near future.
Some qualifications
This hypothesis leaves some things unexplained
as well. It is hard to argue that the funds rate in-
crease on February 4 caught markets completely
by surprise. Given past patterns of Fed behavior,
the mounting evidence of a strong economy
should have led markets to become more and
more convinced that the Fed would act soon.
This should have begun to push up long-term
rates in advance ofthe Fed's actions. Thus, the
fact that long rates rose relatively little before
the Fed's action buthave risen so much since
then suggests markets were very surprised by
what the Fed did; the extent of thissurprise is
puzzling.
In one sense, the puzzle is notnew; a number of
studies have documented anomalous behavior at
the long end of the bond market, independent of
what causes short rates to move, or whether short
rates move at all. In the present context, these
studies present evidence suggesting that-even
before the current episode-a signal that the
Fed was going to raise rates in the near future
would cause long rates to go up by more than
would be warranted by expectedfuture short
rates. (See Hardouvelis, for instance.) Unfor-
tunately, while the anomalous behavior of long-
term rates has been well-documented, it has not
been explained.
Conclusions
This Weekly·Letter has looked at .some of the
hypotheses explaining the recent rise in interest
rates. While part of the rise may be due to an
increase in expected inflation, this explanation
contradicts several key pieces of evidence, and
therefore is unlikely to account for a large portion
of the increase in rates. The rise in rates is more
obviously related to signs of strength in the econ-
omy, both directly and indirectly through antici-
pations of how the Fed will respond in order to
keep inflation in check. Even if one accepts this
explanation, however, the relatively large in-
crease in long rates in response to the Fed's ini-
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